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I. STATE STATUTES AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF DIRECTORS
As a general proposition, the current wave of takeover activity has
produced surprisingly few significant new judicial decisions. The most
recent important decisions-Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC
Network, Inc.,1 and Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.2-are logi-
cal extensions of the Delaware Supreme Court's earlier decisions of
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,' and Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.'
However, one legal development which is quite significant, and
which has largely gone unnoticed, is the emergence of state laws other
than Delaware's and their impact on directors' duties in the takeover
context. In response to a prior takeover wave, many state legislatures
amended their corporate statutes. Recent court interpretations of some
of these statutes have produced a number of decisions5 which are more
protective of directors' discretion in the takeover context than the
enhanced scrutiny of directors' conduct required by the Unocal standard.
These decisions carry out the intent of the state legislatures, and are
strongly protective of incumbent directors and provide unsolicited
acquirers limited opportunities to challenge directors' actions. Whether
the philosophy underlying these statutes will somehow affect the judicial
decision making of the Delaware courts is a question worth noting.
* The contributions to this Article by my colleagues at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz and
John Elofson, a student at the Columbia University School of Law, are gratefully acknowledged.
1. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
2. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
3. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985)
4. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
5. See infra pp. 3-7.
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A. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America
In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,6 the United States
Supreme Court upheld Indiana's "Control Share Acquisitions Statute,"7
finding that it was not preempted by the Williams Act 8 and did not dis-
criminate against interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce
Clause.9 The Court noted that "[s]o long as each State regulates voting
rights only in the corporations it has created, each corporation will be
subject to the law of only one State."'" The Court stressed that "state
regulation of corporate governance is regulation of entities whose very
existence and attributes are a product of state law," 1 and that it "is an
accepted part of the business landscape in this country for States to cre-
ate corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to define the rights that
are acquired by purchasing their shares."' 2 The Court concluded that
"[a] State has an interest in promoting stable relationships among parties
involved in the corporations it charters, as well as in ensuring that inves-
tors in such corporations have an effective voice in corporate affairs."' 3
B. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp.
In a subsequent decision, Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal
Foods Corp.,'4 the Seventh Circuit took its cue from CTS and upheld
the Wisconsin Business Corporation Act' 5 against constitutional chal-
lenge. The statute at issue in Amanda banned second-step mergers with
a 10% or greater shareholder for three years after the 10% position is
acquired unless, prior to the 10% stock acquisition, the Board of Direc-
tors of the target gives its approval. 16 The Wisconsin Act, in contrast to,
for example, the Delaware Act, 17 does not contain an exception for
acquisitions of a specified percentage of shares made pursuant to a
tender offer.18
In Amanda, Judge Easterbrook left no doubt as to his personal
views of the statute's desirability: "If our views of the wisdom of state
6. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
7. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42 (West 1989).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e) and 78n(d)-(f) (1994). The Williams Act is part of the federal
securities laws.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
10. 481 U.S. at 89.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 91.
13. Id.
14. 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989).
15. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.0726 (1992).
16. See Amanda, 877 F.2d at 498.
17. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(2) (1991).
18. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.0726.
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law mattered, Wisconsin's takeover statute would not survive. Like our
colleagues who decided MITE and CTS, we believe that antitakeover
legislation injures shareholders." 9  But, he added, "[u]nless a federal
statute or the Constitution bars the way, Wisconsin's choice must be
respected." 2 Thus, the Seventh Circuit rejected preemption and Com-
merce Clause challenges to the Wisconsin law. With respect to the pre-
emption challenge, the Seventh Circuit held that "[o]nly if the Williams
Act gives investors a right to be the beneficiary of [tender] offers could
Wisconsin's law run afoul of the federal rule."2 However, the Court
then noted that because "[i]nvestors have no right to receive tender
offers .... and the Williams Act does not create a right to profit from
the business of making tender offers,"2 2 the Wisconsin law is not
preempted.
Following the CTS decision, many states adopted a variety of take-
over statutes. Typically, these statutes aim to make mergers more diffi-
cult to accomplish, or to effectively reduce the ability to second-guess
directors' decisions made in the takeover context. Control share acquisi-
tion statutes typically deny voting rights to a purchaser who acquires in
excess of 20% of the target's stock, unless such purchaser first obtains
permission of the target's shareholders at a special meeting. "Morato-
rium" or "business combination" statutes provide that if a raider acquires
a certain percentage of a target's stock, for example, 10% or more, the
corporation cannot effect a second-step merger for a fixed period of time
after such acquisition. This is the case unless the target's board approved
such a transaction prior to the triggering acquisition, or unless another
exception applies. Certain states have adopted statutes specifically
rejecting Unocal's heightened standard for directors' conduct and
affirming a company's right to reject, and defend against, inadequate
offers. In addition, a number of states have adopted constituency stat-
utes authorizing a board faced with a takeover to consider the effects the
proposal might have on the company's employees, consumers, neighbor-
ing communities and other corporate constituencies.
The effect of these state statutes was not fully appreciated until the
recent wave of takeover activity gave rise to a number of challenges to
directors' conduct by raiders. In these cases, courts accord directors a
greater degree of deference and a lesser degree of scrutiny, than Dela-
ware's Unocal standard would provide. 23
19. 877 F.2d at 500.
20. Id. at 502.
21. Id. at 504.
22. id. at 504-505.
23. Although the Delaware courts might reach the same outcome if presented with the same
facts.
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C. The Delaware Law
Delaware courts will not defer to board conduct using the tradi-
tional business judgment rule if the board adopts a defensive mechanism
in response to an alleged threat to corporate control or policy.24 In Uno-
cal the Delaware Supreme Court decided that in these circumstances,
board action is subject to judicial review under an 'enhanced scrutiny'
standard, which looks both to the board's process and its action." The
board's decision-making process, including the information relied on,
must satisfy the court's enhanced standard. In addition, the court, unlike
its review under the traditional business judgment rule, will examine the
reasonableness of the directors' decision.26
Instead of the presumption attending the traditional business judg-
ment rule, the directors carry the burden of proving that their process
and conduct satisfy the enhanced Unocal standard. In the context of a
defensive device or transaction, this standard requires that the board
meet a two-pronged test: First, the board must show that it had "reason-
able grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effec-
tiveness existed, 27 which may be shown by the directors' good faith
and reasonable investigation; second, the board must show that the
defensive measure chosen was "reasonable in relation to the threat
posed,"28 which may be demonstrated by the objective reasonableness of
the course chosen. Only if the directors can establish both prongs of the
Unocal test will their actions receive the protections of the business
judgment rule.
Notwithstanding the close scrutiny of a board's actions which Uno-
cal requires, the Delaware Supreme Court's reversal of the Chancery
Court's injunction in Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp. ,29 reaf-
firms Delaware case law granting a board reasonable latitude in respond-
ing to an unsolicited offer. However, Unitrin also demonstrates the
unpredictability of the heavily fact-oriented decision-making necessi-
tated by the Unocal standard, as the inquiry into "proportionality" cre-
ates significant uncertainty.
In Unitrin, Inc. Shareholders Litigation v. Unitrin, Inc.,3" the Dela-
ware Chancery Court preliminarily enjoined a proposed buyback of ten
million shares, or approximately twenty percent of Unitrin's outstanding
shares, at the then current market price, but did not enjoin the board's
24. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 946.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 955.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
30. No. 13656, 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 187 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1994).
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adoption of a shareholder rights plan. The court decided that the first
portion of the Unocal two-prong test-whether a threat to corporate pol-
icy exists-was satisfied. This was based on the board's conclusion that
the price offered by the offeror, American General, in its publicly
announced unsolicited acquisition proposal was inadequate, although the
court considered the threat from American General's all cash offer "a
mild one."3 Rather, the court enjoined the repurchase program based
on the second prong of Unocal's two-part test-proportionality.32 The
court found that, because the repurchase program would raise the Uni-
trin board's stock ownership from 23% to 28%, it would chill proxy
contests. The court decided that this effect was not proportionate under
Unocal because Unitrin had other defenses, which protected Unitrin
shareholders from a coercive or inadequate offer.33 The court thus read
Unocal to authorize judicial inquiry into whether a specific defensive
step is "necessary."
In a sweeping rejection of the Chancery Court's reasoning, the Del-
aware Supreme Court held that the lower court's reading of Unocal
placed too heavy a burden on the directors to justify defensive con-
duct. 4 The Supreme Court ruled that, in applying Unocal, a court
should engage in a two-step process: First, the court should determine
whether the defensive steps were "coercive or preclusive; '35 second, if
the defensive steps were not "coercive or preclusive," then the court
should determine whether the defensive conduct falls within a "range of
reasonableness. 36 If there is no coercion or preclusion, and the conduct
is within the "range of reasonableness," the defensive action will be
upheld.37
On remand, the Delaware Supreme Court accordingly directed the
Chancery Court to make a factual determination of "whether the Unitrin
Repurchase Program would only inhibit American General's ability to
wage a proxy fight and institute a merger or whether it was, in fact,
preclusive. '38 If the repurchase program does not doom any American
General proxy fight to failure, the Supreme Court held that the only
question remaining will be "whether the Repurchase Program was
31. See id. at *24.
32. See id. at *33.
33. See id. t *32.
34. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Amer. Gen., 651 A.2d 1361, 1389-90.
35. A "preclusive" plan is one which deprives the stockholders of their right to receive tender
offers and fundamentally restricts proxy contests. See id. at 1387.
36. See id. at 1387-88.
37. See id. at 1388.
38. On this issue, the Supreme Court itself found that a proxy contest would remain viable,
noting that "[t]he key variable in a proxy contest would be the merit of American General's issues,
not the size of its stockholdings." Id. at 1383.
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within a range of reasonableness."39 The Supreme Court then mapped
out the factors that the Chancery Court should address to determine
''reasonableness:"
In considering whether the Repurchase Program was within a range
of reasonableness the Court of Chancery should take into considera-
tion whether: (1) it is a statutorily authorized form of business deci-
sion which a board of directors may routinely make in a non-takeover
context; (2) as a defensive response to American General's Offer it
was limited and corresponded in degree or magnitude to the degree or
magnitude of the threat (i.e., assuming the threat was relatively
"mild," was the response relatively "mild?"); (3) with the Repurchase
Program, the Unitrin Board properly recognized that all shareholders
are not alike, and provided immediate liquidity to those shareholders
who wanted it.4°
The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Unitrin thus reaffirms a
board's discretion to act within a range of reasonably proportional
responses to unsolicited offers, and rejects judicial identification of the
"necessary" actions in this context.
D. Recent Decisions Under Other States' Laws
Under the Unocal standard, courts have rendered decisions which
give directors reasonable latitude to use defensive measures in the take-
over context. These decisions have been reached after a thorough
review of the directors' conduct, and of the information which the direc-
tors themselves analyzed in reaching their decision. Several recent cases
demonstrate the differences between the Delaware approach and the
approaches of certain other jurisdictions.
In WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,4  which arose out of
Tyson Food's attempted hostile takeover of WLR Foods, the Fourth Cir-
cuit affirmed the federal district court's decision based on Virginia's
Business Judgment Statute.42 The Virginia statute sets forth a subjective
standard of care for directors, 43 which intentionally excludes any refer-
ence to the reasonableness of the director's conduct. The Fourth Circuit
found that "it is precisely such a comparison between a director and the
hypothetical reasonable person that the Virginia legislature explicitly
chose to reject when it enacted [the standard of care]."" Thus, "the
actions of a director are to be judged by his or her good faith in perform-
39. Id. at 1389.
40. Id.
41. 65 F.3d 1172 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 921 (1996).
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (Michie 1993).
43. "A director shall discharge his duties as a director.., in accordance with his good faith
business judgment of the best interests of the corporation." VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(A).
44. WLR Foods, 65 F.3d at 1185.
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ing corporate duties, and not by the substantive merit of the director's
decisions themselves. .... Directors' actions in Virginia are not to be
judged for their reasonableness. 45
Tyson Foods, the hostile bidder, argued that in order to determine
whether the directors' decisions were made in good faith, it was neces-
sary to know the substantive content of the information that was avail-
able to them.46 The district court rejected this argument and the Fourth
Circuit concurred, finding that the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion in denying Tyson Foods' discovery requests as to the substantive
content of the recommendations made to WLR's board of directors by
its advisors.47 Rather, Tyson Foods was entitled to discover only the
"procedural indicia of whether the directors resorted in good faith to an
informed decisionmaking process. ' This included, for example, infor-
mation as to what topics were discussed at Board meetings and when
advisors were hired, but not information regarding the substantive
advice rendered by advisors. From a practical standpoint, however, a
bidder will find it extraordinarily difficult or impossible to establish
director misconduct without having access to the information the tar-
get's directors considered.
The State of Ohio has adopted a significant amount of takeover
legislation, including a Control Share Acquisition Statute49 and a Busi-
ness Combination Statute.5 ° Ohio also adopted a statute providing that
any violation of the directors' duties relating to an actual or potential
change in control of the corporation, including a determination to resist
the change in control, must be proven by clear and convincing evi-
dence. 51 In addition, the Ohio corporate law includes a very broad con-
stituency statute,52 which requires a director to consider the interests of
the corporation's shareholders and permits the director to consider: (1)
"The interests of the corporation's employees, suppliers, creditors, and
customers; (2) [t]he economy of the state and nation; (3) [c]ommunity
and societal considerations; (4) [t]he long-term as well as short-term
interests of the corporation and its shareholders, including the possibility
that these interests may be best served by the continued independence of
the corporation. 53
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 1185-86.
48. Id. at 1186.
49. Orno REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Anderson 1992).
50. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1704.01-1704.07.
51. See id. § 1701.59(C).
52. See id. § 1701.59(E).
53. Id.
1997]
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This panoply of statutes, and their underlying philosophy, came
into play when United Dominion Industries made a hostile bid for Com-
mercial Intertech Corporation in the summer of 1996. Commercial
Intertech responded to United Dominion's tender offer by declaring a
spin-off distribution of its crown jewel subsidiary.54 United Dominion
sought to enjoin the spin-off, which was scheduled to occur prior to the
special shareholders' meeting which had been requested to vote on
United Dominion's tender offer, as required under Ohio's Control Share
Acquisition Statute.55 Noting that nothing in the Statute prevents a
board from taking defensive action before the special shareholders meet-
ing, a federal district court in Ohio refused to permit United Dominion
to even amend its complaint to seek to enjoin the spinoff. The court also
referred to statutory provisions giving an Ohio corporation the right to
"resist a change or potential change in control of the corporation if the
directors, by majority vote of a quorum determine that the change or
potential change is opposed to or not in the best interests of the
corporation. 56
The recent battle over Conrail between its competing suitors, CSX
and Norfolk Southern, demonstrates the importance of Pennsylvania's
various takeover statutes. Conrail entered into a merger agreement with
CSX, and sought to preserve and complete that merger in the face of
higher-valued bids by Norfolk Southern.57 Norfolk Southern asserted
that the board of directors of Conrail violated its fiduciary duties to its
shareholders and sought to enjoin the lower-valued Conrail/CSX
transaction.
The federal district court in Philadelphia denied Norfolk Southern's
request 58 and made a number of pointed observations about the differ-
ence between the corporate laws of Pennsylvania and those of Delaware.
The court observed that Pennsylvania statutory law stands expressly
against the proposition that the sole or primary consideration by a board
in considering competing offers is which offeror provides the best short-
range price or profit for shareholders. The Court described as "myopic"
the Unocal and Revlon doctrines that "because stockholders are at least
54. See United Dominion Indus. Ltd. v. Commercial Intertech Corp., 943 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.
Ohio 1996).
55. See id. at 860; OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831(c).
56. See OHIo RaV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(B). In contrast, the Delaware Chancery Court
enjoined a planned spin-off of Pillsbury's Burger King subsidiary, which was part of Pillsbury's
defense against a hostile tender offer by Grand Metropolitan PLC. See Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd.
Co. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1061 (Del. Ch. 1988).
57. See Richard Tomkins, Battle for Conrail Reaches Stalemate, FIN. POST, Feb. 14, 1997, at
58.
58. See Karen Donovan, Titans Clash in Takeover Battle in PA, NAT'L LAW J., Jan. 20, 1997,
at Al.
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in theory the owners of the corporation that only their interests should be
considered or at a minimum must be given the highest priority and
importance." In reaching its decision, the court relied on a number of
Pennsylvania statutory provisions which (i) authorize directors to con-
sider the effects of any action on a variety of corporate constituents and
do not require that directors weigh the interests of any particular constit-
uent group, including shareholders, more heavily than the interests of
another; and (ii) reject the applicability of Unocal's enhanced scrutiny of
directors' actions, and reaffirm the applicability of the traditional busi-
ness judgment rule, in the change of control context.59
II. CONTINUING DIRECTORS AND SHAREHOLDERS' RIGHTS PLANS
In recent years, a number of companies have adopted shareholder
rights plans ("poison pills") which include continuing director ("dead
hand") provisions. These provisions prevent the redemption of share
purchase rights issued under a rights plan, unless that action is approved
by a majority of "continuing directors."6 Such provisions can have a
chilling effect on proxy contests, which are part of the usual strategy for
a hostile acquisition. Since the emergence and widespread validation of
rights plans by courts and legislatures throughout the country, hostile
bidders have routinely included, as part of any takeover attempt, a proxy
contest to remove the target's directors whose refusal to redeem the
rights plan would otherwise block the takeover.
Neither courts nor commentators have yet considered in much
detail the permissibility of continuing directors provisions. The one case
that has directly addressed the question suggests that such provisions are
invalid under New York law.6 However, there is no case applying Dela-
ware law which indicates whether such provisions are permissible.62
There is similarly almost no authority on the question of whether
"watered down" continuing director provisions63 are acceptable.
A. The Legal Standard Under Which Continuing Director Rights
Plans are Analyzed
Delaware courts have applied Unocal to board decisions both to
adopt, and not to redeem, rights plans.64 Because such plans "are, by
59. See PA CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1502(a)(18) (1995).
60. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen., 651 A.2d at 1369 n.6. "Continuing directors" are generally
those who held office before the takeover bidder emerged.
61. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 80-101 and accompanying text.
63. "Watered down" provisions are those which are effective for only a limited time, or only
in some change of control situations.
64. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1985).
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definition, defensive,' 65 and therefore raise the spectre of management
entrenchment, courts have found that they warrant heightened judicial
scrutiny. 66 The Unocal standard applies whether or not the plan at issue
was adopted in reaction to an immediate threat to management control
of the corporation.67
When a rights plan is challenged, a board has the burden of demon-
strating that its plan is not "preclusive" or "draconian" 68 and that its
decision to adopt the plan falls within a "range of reasonableness. 69 If
plaintiffs can demonstrate that the "primary purpose" of a challenged
rights plan was to impede a shareholder vote, the board will have to
show a "compelling justification" for the decision; otherwise, the board
might be found to have breached the duty of loyalty.7° This doctrine is
held to be a "specific expression" of the Unocal test as applied to the
election context, rather than a separate, more stringent standard.7'
B. Case Law on Continuing Director Rights Plans
One of the few cases to have directly addressed the validity of a
continuing director provision is Bank of New York Co., Inc. v. Irving
Bank Corp.72 There, the New York Supreme Court enjoined the use of a
provision of the defendant corporation's rights plan which allowed the
board to redeem the rights only if: (1) it had a majority of continuing
directors; or (2) if the new directors immediately succeeded continuing
directors and (a) were elected by a two-thirds majority, or (b) were
elected when no merger proposal was pending.73 According to the
court, this element of the plan ran afoul of § 620 of the New York Busi-
ness Corporation Law, requiring all restrictions on a board's power to be
placed in the Certificate of Incorporation.74 The court, however, was
less concerned that the plan limited the board's power than that it did so
in a discriminatory way:
The evil of [the provision] is not that it deprives a Board of certain
powers; it is that it is selective in the deprivation. In other words, the
present Board members could have the powers, if they were reelected
65. See Moore Corp. Ltd. v. Wallace Computer Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545, 1556 (D. Del.
1995).
66. See id. at 1554.
67. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen., 651 A.2d 1361; Moran, 500 A.2d at 1350.
68. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen., 651 A.2d at 1387-88.
69. See id. at 1388.
70. See Sutton Holding Corp. v. DeSoto, Inc., Civ. A. No. 12051, 1991 WL 80223, at *1
(Del. Ch. May 14, 1991); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988).
71. See Shamrock Holdings v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 286 (Del. Ch. 1989). This is so,
despite the potential need for a board to show a compelling justification for its actions.
72. 528 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
73. See id. at 483.
74. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 620 (McKinney 1986).
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to the Board, but the insurgents would not if they were elected by the
same plurality. Those new members of the Board approved by the
current Board would have the powers, but those not so approved
would not.
7 5
Plaintiffs in Delaware courts have raised objections to continuing
director provisions on several occasions, but no clear holding has yet
emerged. In Davis Acquisition, Inc. v. NWA, Inc. ,76 the Delaware Chan-
cery Court considered a rights plan which could not be redeemed for a
period of 180 days following the election of a board with a majority of
noncontinuing directors. The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunc-
tion against the use of this plan, arguing that use of this provision was an
intentional manipulation of the shareholder voting process under Blasius
Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.,7 and that it was beyond the power of the
incumbent board to so limit the authority of future directors. 78 In sup-
port of the latter point, the plaintiffs contended that Delaware courts'
acceptance of rights plans under Moran is predicated on the assumption
that directors will have the ability to make a judgment whether or not to
redeem a plan at the time a tender offer is made, and that the defendants'
plan would compromise this ability.79 In addition, the plaintiffs asserted
that the plan "discriminate[d] between possible future boards based upon
who nominates a majority of the new board."'80 In response, the defend-
ants claimed that the plan was acceptable under Moran and Unocal, par-
ticularly because it was only effective for a limited time. The defendants
also pointed out that the directors had announced their willingness to
explore extraordinary transactions; thus, the principal issue for share-
holders was which set of directors should be responsible for such a
process.81
After having outlined the arguments, however, the court declined to
resolve them. The court denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary
injunction, not because the plan was likely to be upheld at trial, 82 but
because it found that the mere existence of the continuing director provi-
sion would not unduly influence the proxy contest in which the parties
were engaged. 83 The court was quite concerned that the grant of a pre-
liminary injunction during the pendency of an election may have an
75. Bank of New York, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
76. Civ. A. No. 10761, 1989 WL 40845 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 1989).
77. See id. at *1, *2.
78. See id. at *2.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. See id. at *3.
82. See id. at *7. The court expressly reserved judgment on this point.
83. See id. at *5-7.
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impact on the election's outcome. 4 However, the court also sought to
avoid creating any impression that in denying the preliminary injunction,
it implicitly approved the continuing director redemption provisions.8 5
Rather, the court committed to determine the validity of the redemption
provisions within forty-five days of the annual meeting, and required
that the shareholders be advised that litigation challenging the validity of
the redemption provisions was pending.8 6
In Prime Computer, Inc. v. Allen, 7 a would-be acquiror brought a
challenge to the continuing director provisions of a rights plan, which
could only be redeemed by a majority of the continuing directors,
though this requirement would be waived if an all-cash, all-shares offer
was made.88 The court, however, held that its preliminary injunction
against a consent solicitation by-law adopted by the target company ren-
dered a decision on the plan's legality unnecessary.8 9
In Sutton Holding Corp. v. DeSoto, Inc.,9" the Delaware Chancery
Court considered a somewhat analogous situation involving a provi-
sion-adopted in the midst of a proxy contest-which provided that a
corporation could not terminate its pension plans nor amend them to
reduce benefits for five years following a change in control of the corpo-
ration.9' A change in control was deemed to have occurred when an
acquiror became a beneficial owner of 35% of the voting stock of the
company without the approval of two-thirds of the entire board and a
majority of the continuing directors, or when one-third or more of the
board consisted of members not nominated by the incumbent board. 92
The Chancery Court indicated that the adoption of this provision
probably amounted to an intentional attempt to coerce the exercise of the
shareholder franchise, and thus constituted a violation of the directors'
duty of loyalty. 93 Though this conclusion was dictum, the court's rea-
soning lends support to the proposition that continuing director provi-
sions are impermissible: "The most critical defect [of the plan], in my
opinion, is the fact that the 'enemy' here, the raider, includes anyone
that the shareholders elect but that the board has not nominated. '' 94 This
language suggests the court believed that continuing director provisions
84. see id. at *6.
85. See id. at *7.
86. See id.
87. 1988 WL 5277 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 1988), aff'd, 540 A.2d 417 (Del. 1988).
88. See id. at *2.
89. See id. at *8.
90. Civ. A. No. 12051, 1991 WL 80223 (Del. Ch. May 14, 1991).
91. See id. at *1.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. Id. at *1 n.3.
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are designed to impede would-be raiders who are supported by share-
holders but opposed by incumbent management, and therefore bring into
doubt the good faith of incumbents who use such provisions.
Because of the unique facts of the case, however, the court may
have been inclined to find a breach of fiduciary duty. The target com-
pany's pension plan had a surplus which amounted to 50% of the value
of the company's market capitalization.95 Both the incumbent board and
the challengers had announced their intent to terminate the plan and dis-
tribute the excess to shareholders.96 Implementation of the continuing
directors provisions of the pension plans, though, would have made this
difficult, if not impossible, for the challengers. In this situation, the con-
tinuing directors provisions may have appeared explicable only as a cyn-
ical attempt to manipulate the shareholder voting process: the
provisions' sole effect would then be to prevent the challengers from
taking an apparently popular action which the incumbents meant to take
as well.97
III. CONCLUSION
In Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc.,9 s the Delaware Supreme Court
upheld the rights plan at issue in part because the acquiror could have
reduced the plan's impact by:
[(1)] tendering with a condition that the Board redeem the Rights,
[(2)] tendering with a high minimum condition of shares and
Rights,99 [(3)] tendering and soliciting consents to remove the Board
and redeem the Rights, [(4)] acquiring 50% of the shares and causing
[the target company] to self-tender for the Rights.... [or (5) forming
a group holding shares just short of the plan's trigger] and solicit[ing]
proxies for consents to remove the Board and redeem the Rights.10
An effective continuing director provision would eliminate some of
these options, but not all. Tendering on the condition that the rights be
redeemed, at least, would remain available but may be impractical in
view of the ability of incumbent directors to deny requests for redemp-
tion. Tendering with a high minimum condition could conceivably be
effective in certain circumstances, although the minimum condition may
need to be set at a level which is so high that the offer's viability is
95. See id. at *2.
96. See id.
97. In most cases, however, incumbent directors will be able to raise a colorable argument
that their rights plan was intended to serve some legitimate policy interest. In such cases, a claim
of breach of the duty of loyalty will be more difficult to sustain.
98. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
99. In these circumstances the bidder would bear the economic cost of the rights which it did
not acquire.
100. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354.
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highly questionable. The continuing director provision would, however,
negate or significantly limit the effectiveness of the tactic which hostile
bidders have invariably used in seeking to acquire companies which
have rights plans-a tender offer or public acquisition proposal coupled
with a proxy contest or consent solicitation to remove the target's direc-
tors and redeem the rights.
The board of a target company, which seeks to sustain a continuing
director provision, could argue that the provision is valid because it does
not eliminate the duties of those directors. Such an argument could rely
on the following language from the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion
in Moran:
[Tlhe Rights Plan [at issue] is not absolute. When the Household
Board of Directors is faced with a tender offer and a request to
redeem the Rights, they will not be able to arbitrarily reject the offer.
They will be held to the same fiduciary standards any other board of
directors would be held to in deciding to adopt a defensive mecha-
nism, the same standard as they were held to in originally approving
the Rights Plan.' °"
However, this passage may be construed to imply that each director
must have a voice in a decision to redeem, or to refuse redemption of,
rights, as each owes fiduciary duties to the shareholders. However, this
conclusion is far from obvious, especially since this factor was only one
of several considered by the court.
A further question is how a court in a state other than Delaware,
where rights plans are validated by corporate statute rather than judicial
precedent, would regard a continuing director provision. Such a court
may not look to the Moran case and the history of and rationale for
upholding the validity of such instruments, but instead may rely on a
legislative determination that authorizes rights plans as a matter of pol-
icy, without the sophisticated discussion of the nuances of rights plans in
which the Delaware courts have engaged.
101. Id.
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